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Abstract. We consider a finite population of individuals that can move through
a structured environment using our previously developed flexible evolutionary
framework. In the current paper the behaviour of the individuals follows a
Markov movement model where decisions about whether they should stay or
leave depends upon the group of individuals they are with at present. The
interaction between individuals is modelled using a public goods game. We
demonstrate that cooperation can evolve when there is a cost associated with
movement. Combining the movement cost with a larger population size has
a positive effect on the evolution of cooperation. Moreover, increasing the
exploration time, which is the amount of time an individual is allowed to ex-
plore its environment, also has a positive effect. Unusually, we find that the
evolutionary dynamics used does not have a significant effect on these results.
1. Introduction. Evolutionary game theory has proved to be an effective method1
of modelling the evolution of populations. The original models focused on well-2
mixed infinite populations [36, 35], with games such as the Hawk-Dove game [34] and3
the sex ratio game [26] being used. With further development, these models can be4
considered within well-mixed finite populations [39, Chapters 6-9] ([37, 38] provided5
important results for finite populations without game theoretical methods).6
The seminal work of [31] (see also [5, 10, 53, 32], and [3, 49] for reviews) in which7
evolutionary graph theory was developed, allowed the modelling of structured finite8
populations within a given framework. It also provided important results in the9
fixed fitness case [31, 33, 45]. However, this approach is limited by the fact that it10
is suited to modelling pairwise interactions, whereas in real populations, there are11
interactions between multiple individuals [50, 19], and there are many examples of12
multiplayer games used in the literature [44, 8, 14, 24]. In [41] it was shown that13
evolutionary graph theory can be used in conjunction with a different ‘interaction’14
graph to model more complex behaviours but there is no obvious link between the15
two graphs, that is, one graph has not been derived from the other nor is there some16
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clear connection, for instance both being derived from some common population-17
derived factors.18
We should also mention that structured populations have been considered in19
an evolutionary context in different ways, see for example [51]. This includes is-20
land models, where populations evolve in isolated communities with a low rate of21
migration between them, as in [18]. Community-structured populations were con-22
sidered in [54], where interactions occur at multiple levels, with members of the23
same community interacting more commonly than those in different communities.24
A more general framework that can be used is that of [11] where it is possible25
to consider multiplayer interactions in groups of any size, depending upon various26
factors like the population’s history, whilst keeping the beneficial aspects of evolu-27
tionary graph theory. More recently this framework has been used to model different28
kinds of multiplayer behaviour [13, 9, 12]. In this paper, we extend this work to29
consider a population of mobile individuals, focusing on a specific multiplayer game,30
a public goods game [6, 7, 25, 55].31
When using the evolutionary graph theory approach [30, 52, 29, 46, 58], individ-32
uals group with their neighbours within a fixed population structure. One potential33
problem with this is that individuals could spend more time with some of their34
neighbours, less with others and some time alone. The framework of [11] solves this35
problem as shown in [13, 9] using a simple model where individuals are confined36
to their neighbourhood but are still allowed to form groups of different sizes. The37
framework, though, is capable of handling much more complex movement behaviour38
[1, 2, 21] where individuals make a choice of where to move given the information39
they have at hand. In this paper we apply the framework for the first time to one40
such model where the movement of individuals follows the Markov property.41
The paper is structured as follows: in Section 2 the model framework is described42
in general, with examples of each concept being given to motivate how it can be43
applied, in Section 3 the framework is applied to create a Markov movement model,44
in Section 4 we describe the results of the Markov movement model, and Section 545
is a general discussion.46
2. The framework of [11]. This section presents the framework of [11] for mod-47
elling the evolution of a population in a which the movement of individuals follows a48
discrete-time stochastic process. In particular we update the terminology from the49
original paper somewhat, and the methodology described here will be applicable to50
a wide variety of scenarios, although we focus on a Markov movement model (and51
indeed a specific one only) in the current paper. The framework can be broken52
down into three components that each describe a certain aspect of the population:53
structure, fitness, and evolutionary dynamics.54
2.1. The population: structure and distribution. The population structure55
describes the restrictions upon how members of the population can interact with56
each other, including through the different places each individual can and cannot57
visit. This paper focuses on a Markov movement model, and in the type of examples58
that we consider all places are visitable by all individuals. The structure here will59
reduce to simply considering the distribution of the population individuals at any60
given time, and so we shall find it convenient to talk about distribution in place61
of structure. In a population of N individuals who can move around M places,62
the population distribution at time t is given in [11] by an N ×M binary matrix63
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Table of Notation
Notation Definition Description
N ∈ Z+ Population size.
M ∈ Z+ Number of places.
In Individual n.
Pm Place m.
mn,t ∈ {1, . . . ,M} Place where In is at time t.
mt = [mn,t]
N
n=1 Population distribution at time t.
m<t = (mt−1, . . . ,m0) Population distribution history.
pt(m|m<t) ∈ [0, 1] Probability population has distribution m at time t given
history m<t.
pit ∈ [0, 1] Population distribution probability function (PDPF).
P (m<t) ∈ [0, 1] Probability that population has history m<t.
pin,t ∈ [0, 1] Individual distribution probability function (IDPF).
fn,t ≥ 0 Fitness contribution of In at time t.
Fn,t > 0 Fitness of In at time t.
Gn ⊂ {1, 2 . . . , N} Direct group: group that In is in.
wi,j,t ≥ 0 Replacement weight that Ii replaces Ij at time t.
Wt = [wi,j,t]i,j=1,...,N Weighted adjacency matrix of evolutionary graph.
ui,j,t ≥ 0 Replacement weight contribution that Ii assigns to Ij at
time t.
A,B Two types of individuals in population.
S ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , N} Population state, n ∈ S if In has type A.
N = {1, 2, . . . , N} State consisting of all type A individuals.
PSS′ ∈ [0, 1] Probability of transitioning from S to S ′.
ρAS ∈ [0, 1] Fixation probability of type A when initial state is S.
rij ∈ [0, 1] Probability that Ii replaces Ij .
hn ∈ [0, 1] Probability that In stays.
αn ∈ [0, 1] Staying propensity : probability that individual In stays
when alone.
C (D) Cooperator and defector interactive strategy.
βC (βD) ∈ R Benefit of being with cooperator (defector).
S ∈ (0, 1) Sensitivity shown to group members.
v > 0 Reward as a multiple of background fitness.
c ∈ [0, 1) Cost as a multiple of background fitness.
Rn ≥ 0 Payoff to In.
λ ∈ [0,min(Rn)) Movement cost.
T ∈ Z+ Exploration time.
Cα (Dα) Cooperator (defector) with staying propensity α.
γ (δ) ∈ [0, 1] Nash equilibrium staying propensity of cooperator (defec-
tor).
Table 1. Notation used in the paper.
denoted Xt = (X
(t)
n,m) and defined64
X(t)n,m =
{
1 if In is in Pm at time t,
0 otherwise.
(1)65
66
4 K. PATTNI, M. BROOM AND J. RYCHTA´Rˇ
To consider the Markov movement models that are the subject of the current paper,67
it is convenient to use an alternative matrix representation of the population dis-68
tribution. Here the population distribution at time t will be denoted by the matrix69
Mt = [Mn,t]n=1,...,N , where Mn,t = m if individual In is in place Pm at time t.70
The framework assumes that the movement of individuals is probabilistic such71
that there is dependence upon time and the current and past movements of in-72
dividuals in the population. In particular, the transition probability function de-73
noted pt(m|m<t) gives the probability that the movement of individuals at time74
t results in a population distribution m given the population distribution history75
m<t = (mt−1, . . . ,m1,m0). The transition probability function is defined as follows76
pt(m|m<t) = P(Mt = m|Mt−1 = mt−1, . . . ,M0 = m0) (2)7778
whose exact form will depend upon the model being used but will always satisfy79
1 =
∑
m
pt(m|m<t) ∀ t,m<t. (3)80
81
The population distribution probability function (PDPF) pit(m) gives the prob-82
ability that the population distribution is m after t time steps regardless of the83
population distribution history. It can be expressed using the transition probabili-84
ties as85
pit(m) =P(Mt = m) =
∑
m<t
pt(m|m<t)P (m<t) (4)86
87
where P (m<t) denotes the historical PDPF that gives the probability that the88
population distribution history is m<t and is written as89
P (m<t) =P(M0 = m0,M1 = m1, . . . ,Mt−1 = mt−1)90
=pt−1(mt−1|m<t−1) · · · p1(m1|m0)pi0(m0) (5)9192
where the probability of the initial population distribution, pi0(m0), is assumed to93
be known.94
2.1.1. An individual movement model. In this model it is assumed that individuals95
move independently of each other. The PDPF can then be defined as follows96
pit(m) =
∏
n
pin,t(mn) (6)97
98
where pin,t(mn) denotes the individual distribution probability function (IDPF) that99
gives the probability of individual In being present in place Pmn at time t indepen-100
dently of the history of the process. The expression for pin,t(mn) will depend upon101
whether the movement of In is dependent upon the whole population distribution102
history or just its own individual history.103
Dependence on the population distribution history. When the movement of individ-104
ual In depends upon the distribution history of the whole population, the individual105
transition probability function pn,t(mn|m<t) gives the probability that In moves to106
place mn at time t given the population history m<t and is given as follows107
pt(mn|m<t) = P(Mn,t = mn|Mt−1 = mt−1, . . . ,M0 = m0). (7)108109
The individual transition probability function is then defined as follows110
pin,t(mn) =
∑
m<t
pn,t(mn|m<t)P (m<t). (8)111
112
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Dependence on the individual distribution history. When the movement of individ-113
ual In depends only upon its own distribution history mn,<t = (mn,t−1, . . . ,mn,0),114
independent from the history of the other individuals, then the individual transition115
probability function is given as follows116
pt(mn|mn,<t) = P(Mn,t = mn|Mn,t−1 = mn,t−1, . . . ,Mn,0 = mn,0). (9)117118
The IDPF is then given by119
pin,t(mn) =
∑
mn,<t
pn,t(mn|mn,<t)Pn(mn,<t) (10)120
121
where Pn(mn,<t) denotes the individual history distribution as follows122
Pn(mn,<t) = pn,t−1(mn,t−1|mn,<t−1) · · · pn,1(mn,1|mn,0)pi0(mn,0). (11)123124
2.1.2. The fully independent movement model. In this model individuals move in-125
dependently of each other, history and time. In this case, the individual transition126
function is denoted pn(m) and we have that127
pin,t(mn) = pn(mn)
1︷ ︸︸ ︷∑
mn,<t
Pn(mn,<t) = pn(mn) (12)128
129
and therefore the PDPF can simply be written130
pit(m) = p(m). (13)131132
2.2. Fitness. In the framework the contribution to an individual’s fitness depends133
upon the time t, the current population distribution m and historical population134
distributions m<t. The fitness contribution of In is denoted135
fn,t(m|m<t) (14)136137
where the exact form will depend upon the assumptions about the factors that138
contribute to an individual’s fitness. The mean fitness contribution at time t is139
then as follows140
f¯n,t =
∑
m
∑
m<t
fn,t(m|m<t)pt(m|m<t)P (m<t). (15)141
142
We assume that the fitness of an individual at time t is given by averaging the143
mean fitness contribution across all time periods up to and including t. The fitness144
function is then defined as follows145
Fn,t =
1
t
t∑
k=1
f¯n,k. (16)146
147
Note that there are other definitions of the fitness function that one can use instead148
of the one given here, for example, one could use a weighted average of the mean149
fitness contribution instead.150
When there is fully independent movement, the mean fitness change simplifies151
to152
f¯n,t =
∑
m
∑
m<t
fn,t(m|m<t)p(m)P (m<t). (17)153
154
In [9] it is assumed that the fitness contribution of individual In only depends upon155
those individuals that it can directly interact with. The direct group (or simply the156
6 K. PATTNI, M. BROOM AND J. RYCHTA´Rˇ
Dynamics
BDB bi =
Fi∑
n Fn
, dij =
wij∑
n win
BDD bi =
1
N
, dij =
wijF
−1
j∑
n winF
−1
n
DBD dj =
F−1j∑
n F
−1
n
, bij =
wij∑
n wnj
DBB dj =
1
N
, bij =
wijFi∑
n wnjFn
LB rij =
wijFi∑
n,k wnkFn
LD rij =
wijF
−1
j∑
n,k wnkF
−1
k
Table 2. Dynamics defined using the replacement weights and
fitnesses as in [45]. In each case, B (D) is appended to the name of
the dynamics if selection happens in the birth (death) event. For
BDB and BDD dynamics rij = bidij , for DBD and DBB dynamics
rij = djbij .
group) of individual In, denoted Gn(m), is the set of individuals that are present157
with it in the same place for population distribution m and is defined as follows158
Gn(m) = {i : mi = mn}. (18)159160
We then denote the fitness contribution as fn(Gn(m)). In this case, the mean fitness161
change is constant over time and therefore the fitness is equal to the mean fitness162
contribution, that is163
Fn = f¯n =
∑
m
fn(Gn(m))p(m). (19)164
165
2.3. Evolutionary Dynamics. In the framework it is assumed that there is one166
birth and death per replacement event. A replacement event at time t is governed167
by an evolutionary graph defined using an N ×N weighted adjacency matrix Wt =168
[wi,j,t]i,j=1,...,N where the replacement weight wi,j,t gives the weight of the edge169
from node i to node j in the evolutionary graph that represent individuals Ii and170
Ij respectively.171
The contribution to a replacement weight depends upon the time t, the current172
population distribution m and the historical population distributions m<t. The173
replacement weight contribution that individual Ii assigns individual Ij is denoted174
by175
ui,j,t(m|m<t). (20)176177
The exact form will depend upon the assumptions made about the replacement178
weight contributions. The mean replacement weight contribution is given as follows179
u¯i,j,t =
∑
m
∑
m<t
ui,j,t(m|m<t)pt(m|m<t)P (m<t). (21)180
181
In this paper, we choose the replacement weight at time t as the mean replacement182
weight contribution at time t as in [21] that is183
wi,j,t = u¯i,j,t (22)184185
but, as for the fitness function, there are other definitions that one can use.186
The probability that the offspring of individual Ii replaces individual Ij , denoted187
rij , is defined using the replacement weights and fitnesses as in [45]. The different188
definitions of the replacement probabilities are summarised in Table 2.189
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For the fully independent movement model, the mean replacement weight con-190
tribution is defined as follows191
u¯i,j,t =
∑
m
∑
m<t
ui,j,t(m,m<t)p(m)P (m<t). (23)192
193
In [9], the replacement weight contribution is independent of time and history, and194
depends only upon direct groups. This implies that the mean replacement weight195
is invariant over time and is as follows196
wi,j = u¯i,j =
∑
m
ui,j(Gn(m))p(m). (24)197
198
2.4. The evolutionary Markov chain. The evolution of the population can now199
be described in terms of a Markov chain. We will assume that there are only two200
types of individuals in the population, which we label A and B. Furthermore, each201
type is made up of made up of two different characteristics, and we will say more202
about this in the following sections. A state of the population gives its composition203
in terms of type A and B individuals. We use S to denote a state of the population204
such that n ∈ S if In is of type A. There are a total of 2N different states where205
N (∅) is the state consisting of all type A (B) individuals. The state transition206
probabilities are described using the dynamics as follows207
PSS′ =

∑
i∈S rij S ′ = S ∪ {j},∑
i/∈S rij S ′ = S \ {j},∑
i,j∈S
i,j /∈S
rij S ′ = S,
0 otherwise.
(25)208
209
Given that the state of the population is given by S, type A (B) is said to fixate210
from that state when all type B (A) individuals have been replaced and we reach211
state N (∅). Once a certain type has fixated no more changes can take place and the212
population remains in this state. The probability of type A individuals given by S213
fixating in a population where the type B individuals are given by N \S is denoted214
ρAS (and we denote the equivalent fixation probability for type B individuals by ρ
B
S ).215
This probability is found by solving the following equation216
ρAS =
∑
S′
PSS′ρAS′ (26)217
218
with boundary conditions219
ρA∅ =0 and ρ
A
N = 1. (27)220221
For type B individuals we can use the fact that ρBS = 1− ρAS .222
We shall consider a population where a population is all of a single type, but223
where a single population member is selected uniformly at random to be replaced224
by one of the opposite type. We are thus interested in calculating the fixation225
probability where state S consists of only one individual (all but one individual).226
There are N initial states from which the fixation probability can be calculated,227
and we take an arithmetic mean of these fixation probabilities, which we denote228
as ρA (ρB). Alternatively, one could weight the fixation probability of a mutant229
using the likelihood of that mutant appearing [4]. Sometimes this is an important230
distinction, but in the examples considered in the current paper the differences are231
small, and so we have stuck with the traditional, simpler, version.232
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3. The Markov movement model. In the previous models [9] considered in233
this framework, the movement of individuals is limited to their neighbourhood and234
exogenously controlled by the home fidelity parameter that measures how likely235
the individual is to remain in their home. A natural extension to this is to allow236
individual distributions to vary with time. A logical first step is to consider a Markov237
model, which is based on the assumption that history dependence is Markov, that is,238
the current population distribution is only dependent upon the previous population239
distribution. The concept of a Markov movement model within the framework was240
introduced in [11], but was only discussed in general terms. In this paper we fully241
develop it and apply it to example populations for the first time. The definitions242
we have given before would then change as follows; for the PDPF we have243
pit(m) =
∑
m<t
pt(m|mt−1)P (m<t), (28)244
245
for the mean change in fitness we have246
f¯n,t =
∑
m
∑
m<t
fn,t(m|m<t)pt(m|mt−1)P (m<t) (29)247
248
and for the mean replacement weight change we have249
u¯i,j,t =
∑
m
∑
m<t
ui,j,t(m|m<t)pt(m|mt−1)P (m<t). (30)250
251
3.1. Movement with dependence only upon individual history. In this252
model it is assumed that an individual would move independently of the other in-253
dividuals in the population but its current position is dependent upon its previous254
position. The IDPF is then given as follows255
pin,t(m) =
∑
mn,<t
pn,t(m|mn,t−1)P (mn,<t). (31)256
257
This expression can be rewritten using the M × M probability matrix pn,t =258
[pn,t(mn|mn,t−1)] for mn,mn,t−1 = 1, . . . ,M as follows259
pin,t = pin,0
t∏
k=1
pn,k (32)260
261
where pin,t = [pin,t(m)]m=1,...,M . Furthermore, if we assume that there is time262
homogeneity, that is pn,t = pn for all t, then this simplifies to263
pin,t = pin,0p
t
n. (33)264265
In this case, assuming that pn is irreducible and aperiodic for all n, then as t→∞266
the IDPF pin,∞ is stationary for all n. Essentially, our model is then equivalent to267
the fully independent movement model. We do not consider this case further here,268
but rather refer the reader to [9] for a detailed discussion of this kind of model.269
3.2. Individual movement with dependence on population history. In this270
model individuals move to a new position independently of each other but dependent271
upon the current distribution of the whole population. The IDPF is then as follows272
pin,t(m) =
∑
m<t
pn,t(m|mt−1)P (m<t). (34)273
274
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In this paper we construct a model of this type that is made up of the following275
four components: population structure, movement strategy, game and evolutionary276
dynamics.277
3.2.1. The population structure. The population is assumed to be of size N where278
each individuals has a home that they can return to. The structure is described by279
a graph such that each node represents a place. We consider the complete graph280
structure where all places are connected to each other. We assume that every place281
is home to precisely one individual.282
3.2.2. Individual movement. We assume that the individual transition probabilities283
are time homogeneous but dependent upon the previous group and previous position284
of the individuals, that is285
pn,t(m|mn,t−1,Gn(mt−1)) =
{
hn(Gn(mt−1)) m = mn,t−1
1−hn(Gn(mt−1))
N−1 m 6= mn,t−1
(35)286
287
where hn(Gn(mt−1)) denotes the staying probability of individual In and N − 1 is288
the number of neighbouring places that an individual can move to in a complete289
graph.290
The staying probability hn(Gn(mt−1)) will depend upon the staying propensity291
αn of individual In and the attractiveness of remaining in group Gn(mt−1). The292
staying propensity αn measures the likelihood that individual In will stay where293
it is, in particular, hn(Gn(mt−1)) = αn when In is alone (Gn(mt−1) = {n}). The294
staying propensity is assumed to be one of the characteristics that makes up the type295
of an individual. However, when present in a group (|Gn(mt−1)| > 1), individual296
In would take into account the benefit of remaining in that group. The benefit297
βi of group member Ii to others depends upon its interactive strategy, the second298
characteristic that makes up the type of an individual. We will assume that there299
are two interactive strategies, cooperate (C) and defect (D). The benefit function,300
βi is then defined as follows301
βi =
{
βC if Ii cooperator,
βD if Ii defector
(36)302
303
where βC and βD are the benefits of being with a cooperator and defector, respec-304
tively. The benefit of group Gn(mt−1) to individual In is then defined as follows305
βGn(mt−1)\{n} =
∑
i∈Gn(mt−1)\{n}
βi. (37)306
307
Finally, combining the effects of the staying propensity and the group benefit, in308
the rest of the paper the staying probability is expressed as the following sigmoid309
function310
hn(Gn(mt−1)) = αn
αn + (1− αn)SβGn(mt−1)\{n}
(38)311
312
where 0 < S < 1 is the sensitivity shown to group members. So, for example, S → 0313
implies that In shows great sensitivity and would move away immediately if remain-314
ing in group Gn(mt−1) is unattractive, which is the case when βGn(mt−1)\{n} < 0.315
An alternative way of representing the S → 0 limit involves the staying probability316
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being defined using the following step function317
hn(Gn(mt−1)) =

0 |Gn(mt−1)| > 1 and βGn(mt−1)\{n} < 0,
αn |Gn(mt−1)| = 1,
1 |Gn(mt−1)| > 1 and βGn(mt−1)\{n} ≥ 0.
(39)318
319
For example, if we set αn = 0 ∀n, βC = 0 and βD < 0 then the attractiveness320
of a group is completely determined by the presence or absence of defectors. An321
individual would therefore leave with probability 1 if a defector is present in the322
group. This was referred to as the ‘walk away’ strategy in [1].323
In our model we select an exploration time T , which is the number of steps an324
individual takes moving around the region before returning to its home place. Thus325
the larger T , the more time cooperators have to find other cooperators, but also326
the more time there is for them to be found by defectors.327
3.2.3. Fitness. We assume that the change in fitness of an individual depends upon328
direct group interactions and whether a movement has been made.329
For these group interactions we will consider a public goods game in which the330
payoffs are determined by the interactive strategies, cooperate and defect, that we331
introduced earlier. Each individual receives a base reward of 1 regardless of their332
strategy. A cooperator always pays a cost 0 ≤ c < 1 so that every individual that333
it can directly interact with (excluding itself) receives an equal share of a reward334
v > 0. The cost cannot exceed 1 in order to prevent the fitness contribution from335
going negative (this is done for convenience of calculation; it is important that total336
fitness is not negative, and we could deal with large costs if necessary by truncating337
the resulting total fitness at 0). A defector does not pay a cost but receives a share338
of the reward from cooperators present in the group. Note that the base reward has339
been normalised to 1 and the reward v and cost c are multiples of the base reward.340
The direct group interaction payoff functions are then defined as follows341
Rn,t(Gn(mt)) =

1 + |Gn(mt)|C−1|Gn(mt)|−1 v − c In cooperator and |Gn(mt)| > 1,
1− c In cooperator and |Gn(mt)| = 1,
1 + |Gn(mt)|C|Gn(mt)|−1v In defector and |Gn(mt)| > 1,
1 In defector and |Gn(mt)| = 1
(40)342
343
where |G|C is the number of cooperators in group G. Note the cooperators still pay344
a cost when they are alone.345
An individual will pay a cost of λ for every movement that it makes. The346
movement cost is chosen so that it does not exceed the direct group interaction347
payoff an individual receives (for the same reasons as for the cooperative cost c,348
and large movement costs could be similarly accommodated if necessary), that is349
0 ≤ λ < min(Rn,t(Gn(mt))). The fitness contribution is then given by350
fn,t(m,Gn(mt)|mt−1) =
{
Rn,t(Gn(mt))− λ mt 6= mt−1,
Rn,t(Gn(mt)) mt = mt−1.
(41)351
352
It is clear that these fitness contributions vary with time, as the first move from353
the home place follows the distribution for a lone individual, and then movement354
depends upon the groups formed. For instance in a population entirely composed of355
cooperators, individuals would almost cease to move when they had found another356
cooperator, so the level of movement would decrease (and the fitness contributions357
would increase) with time, until the exploration time T is reached.358
MULTIPLAYER MOBILE POPULATION EVOLUTION 11
3.2.4. Evolutionary dynamics. We assume that the replacement weight contribu-359
tion will only depend upon the direct group. As in [9], the replacement weight360
contribution will depend upon the amount of time spent with each individual. In361
particular, it is assumed that an individual spends an equal amount of time with362
each individual in the group excluding itself. However, if the individual is alone,363
then it effectively allocates all the time to itself. The replacement weight contribu-364
tion function is then defined as follows365
ui,j,t(Gi(mt)) =

1/|Gi(mt) \ {i}| i 6= j and j ∈ Gi(mt),
0 i 6= j and j /∈ Gi(mt),
1 i = j and |Gi(mt)| = 1,
0 i = j and |Gi(mt)| > 1.
(42)366
367
We note that combining equations (24) and (42), we have that wi,j = wj,i and368
wi,i = 1 −
∑
j 6=i wi,j , which implies that our selected weights have the isothermal369
property (see [31]).370
3.2.5. Simulating the evolutionary Markov chain. The approach used in this paper371
to calculate the fixation probability is a semi-analytic one where the fitnesses of372
individuals are found by simulation, and these results are then used to evolve the373
population using the evolutionary Markov chain, which results in a more accurate374
solution than simulating the whole process (the movement process is too complex375
to allow for a fully analytic solution).376
Individuals start on their home place and then undergo an exploration phase of377
T time steps as described in Section 3.2.2. To calculate the fitness, the individuals378
move T times such that their fitness contribution is calculated for each of these379
movements; the total of these T fitness contributions gives their fitness for one380
simulation. The position of the individuals is then reset, that is, they return to381
their home place before the next simulation is run. Their average fitness for 10,000382
simulations is used in the evolutionary Markov chain.383
To calculate the replacement weights, individuals start on their home place and384
move only one time to determine their replacement weight. This represents indi-385
viduals returning to their home place to reproduce, with individuals being replaced386
according to the corresponding local connections. This counts as one simulation387
and, before the next simulation is run, we reset the position of the individuals so388
they all start in their home place. The replacement weights are calculated exactly389
because they comprise of only one movement. This involves calculating the prob-390
ability that an individual is alone, which gives the self-replacement weight. The391
other replacement weights are simply 1 minus the self-replacement weight divided392
by N − 1 because the probability of replacing the other individuals is the same for393
a complete graph.394
The fitnesses and the replacement weights are all that is required to construct395
the transition probabilities of the evolutionary Markov chain. The transition prob-396
abilities are substituted into the formula of [28] to give the fixation probability of i397
type A mutants in a population of N − i type B residents as follows398
ρAi =
1 +
∑i−1
j=1
∏j
k=1
P−k
P+k
1 +
∑N−1
j=1
∏j
k=1
P−k
P+k
(43)399
400
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where P−k (P
+
k ) is the backward (forward) transition probability for a state with401
k type A individuals. Note that the weights wij and the fitnesses from Section402
3.2.3 depend upon the composition of the population, so at successive steps of the403
evolutionary Markov chain the transition probabilities will in general be different.404
We also note that this formula can easily be modified to find the fixation proba-405
bility of type B individuals. What exactly makes a type A or B individual would406
depend upon its interactive strategy and staying propensity. For example, we could407
have that A = C0.1 and B = D0.5, which means that type A is a cooperator with408
a staying propensity of 0.1 and type B is a defector with staying propensity 0.5,409
or we could have A = C0.1 and B = C0.2 so both types have the same behavioural410
strategy but different staying propensities. However, the important thing to note is411
that, at any one time, there are only two unique types A and B in the population.412
The advantage of such an approach is that we can relatively quickly calculate the413
fixation probability starting from any state. The saving comes from the fact that414
we do not simulate the entire process, which would take much longer because the415
number of steps to reach fixation could be high. However, this approach necessarily416
requires that we have a population in which individuals can differ only in terms417
of their type. To ensure that this is the case, we consider a complete structure418
with N places such that each individual has their own home place.We note that the419
advantage of efficient algorithmic processes over simulations was demonstrated in420
[48], but also that it was shown in [27] that for frequency-dependent selection this421
approach will not work for arbitrary spatial populations.422
4. Results. In this section the effect of the model parameters on the fixation prob-423
ability are investigated. In particular, we investigate how the model parameters af-424
fect assortment, which is the mechanism that allows cooperation to evolve as shown425
in [22]. There is positive assortment between cooperators if they are more likely426
to interact with other cooperators than defectors. In our model, this occurs due427
to an increase (decrease) in the time it takes for defectors (cooperators) to find co-428
operators. According to [20] the time to find cooperators should depend upon the429
density of the population and an individual’s movement speed. In their model, N430
individuals pair up with one another to form a coalition such that the probability of431
a pair forming is exponentially distributed with rate µ, which is a function of N and432
the population density. The time to find cooperators in their model is essentially433
determined by the rate µ. We have one-to-one correspondence between individuals434
and places and therefore the density remains constant; on the other hand, since we435
consider a complete graph, the movement speed is high as individuals can directly436
get from one place to another. Therefore, the time it takes to find cooperators is437
mostly determined by the staying propensity of the individuals, however, this rela-438
tionship is not so straightforward as it is not globally controlled and the individuals439
may have different staying propensities (which are subject to the evolutionary pro-440
cess). This means that some individuals may find cooperators faster than others.441
The parameters used in the simulations are summarised in Table 3.442
Apart from an individual’s interactive strategy and staying propensity, all other443
parameters are considered to be fixed. Each individual inherits these two charac-444
teristics from its parent, and different interactive strategies or staying propensities445
are introduced into the population through mutations. Staying propensities can446
take any value 0.01m for m = 1, . . . , 99; this means that no individual moves all the447
time or never, and so makes some adjustment to their behaviour depending upon448
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Parameter Set 1 2 3 4 5 6
N 10 10 10 20 10 10
T 10 5 25 10 10 10
λ Variable Variable Variable Variable 0.20 0.20
c 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.09
v 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.4 Variable Variable
Table 3. Parameters used for the simulations. The other param-
eters are fixed such that we have a complete structure with each
individual having its own home, βC = 1, βD = −1, S = 0.03 and
the dynamics used are BDB.
the group they are in. In particular we have max(α) = 0.99; some movement is a449
necessary requirement otherwise the replacement weights would be zero and there450
would be no evolution within the population. In a real world setting, a minimum451
movement requirement can be explained by, for example, foraging behaviour where452
an individual searches its environment to find food and therefore needs to move in453
order to survive.454
The mutations of these characteristics are sufficiently infrequent that the popu-455
lation is assumed to consist of a maximum of two types; resident and mutant, whose456
competition will result in fixation of one of the types before a new mutant appears.457
We consider two different scenarios to account for the different mutation rates of458
each characteristic.459
4.1. Scenario A: Interactive strategy mutations are rare. As previously460
stated, it is assumed that fixation happens much faster than new mutations arise.461
A mutation can result in a change of the interactive strategy and/ or the staying462
propensity. In this scenario, the mutation rate of an individual’s interactive strat-463
egy is much slower than the rate of mutations that involve their staying propensity.464
Since it is much more likely that the staying propensity mutates than the inter-465
active strategy does, once one of the interactive strategies (cooperate or defect) is466
removed from the population, it will be a long time before a new mutant involving467
this strategy appears. During this time, there will be a sequence of contests among468
individuals with the same interactive strategy but different staying propensities and469
the population will eventually evolve to the point where all individuals have the470
same interactive strategy and are using a (strict) Nash equilibrium staying propen-471
sity (a strict Nash equilibrium propensity is one where the fixation probability is472
maximised and changing the staying propensity is disadvantageous). Eventually, a473
mutant with a different interactive strategy and staying propensity will appear, and474
the quantity of interest at this point is the fixation probability of this mutant type.475
We assume that the staying propensity of the mutant can be different from the476
Nash equilibrium staying propensity of the resident population it is invading. The477
resident population will therefore be stable if it can resist invasion from a mutant478
using any staying propensity. Rather than considering any arbitrary mutant, the479
focus will be on the mutant most likely to invade, i.e. one maximising its fixation480
probability.481
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Cooperator residents are of the type CγR where their Nash equilibrium staying482
propensity γR is the staying propensity where a = b in the set483 {
(a, b) : ρCa,Cb1 = max
(
ρCc,Cb1 : c ∈ (0, 1)
)
and b ∈ (0, 1)
}
.484
485
In this set we identify all the points (a, b) where a is the best response staying486
propensity of 1 individual of type Ca when playing against N −1 individual of type487
Cb, who are using some arbitrary staying propensity b. Therefore, at the point488
where a = b, Ca is a best response to itself, i.e. a Nash equilibrium.489
A defector mutant is of the type DδM where the staying propensity δM satisfies490
ρ
DδM ,CγR
1 = max
(
ρ
Dc,CγR
1 : c ∈ (0, 1)
)
.491
492
Defector residents are of the type D0.99 (i.e. in the equivalent terminology to the493
above δR = 0.99) where their Nash equilibrium staying propensity is max(α) = 0.99494
whenever the movement cost is greater than 0 because the only way for them to495
maximize their fixation probability is by moving as little as possible.496
A cooperator mutant is of the type CγM where the staying propensity γM satisfies497
ρ
CγM ,D0.99
1 = max
(
ρCc,D0.991 : c ∈ (0, 1)
)
.498
499
The Nash equilibrium staying propensity of the resident cooperators γR is cal-500
culated as follows. We consider N − 1 residents of the type Cb and calculate the501
fixation probability of 1 individual of the type Ca for all values of a in the range502
[max(0.01, b − 0.09),min(b + 0.09, 0.99)], and the a that gives the highest fixation503
probability is picked. Note that using a wider range of values for a gives the same504
result so this range is used for efficiency. The N − 1 residents then use the staying505
propensity a that was picked and this process is repeated several times. After around506
20 repetitions, the staying propensity that gives the maximum fixation probability507
remains the same, that is, we can see that is a (strict) Nash equilibrium because508
it is a best response to itself and any other strategy will be disadvantageous. We509
therefore set γR to the value of a we get after 20 repetitions.510
We hypothesize that there is only one solution to the Nash equilibrium staying511
propensity. As seen in Figure 1, the best response staying propensity of one type512
Ca against N − 1 type Cb is relatively flat (the jagged line of the figure being513
an approximation to a smooth “real” value, caused by the stochasticity of the514
simulations). Intuitively the real solution should be smooth; a small change in the515
movement cost would have a small change on the payoff to a focal individual. It is516
possible that at some point this would lead to a sudden jump of the best response517
strategy as the payoffs from two different values pass. We would expect to see either518
a single smooth continuous function for the best response, or a piecewise continuous519
collection of distinct parts, and it is the former that we have here. This flatness520
means that the best response staying propensity is predominantly determined by521
the movement cost λ regardless of what the other players are doing. Therefore,522
there is only one intersection point with the line a = b as shown in Figure 1, which523
gives the Nash equilibrium staying propensity γR of resident cooperators. A non-524
unique solution would occur if there were multiple crossings (or indeed no crossings,525
which would need a discontinuity in Figure 1, as described above). We should note526
that we have no proof of the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium staying propensity,527
although in all cases considered, the solution to the process described in the previous528
paragraph is independent of the starting position.529
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Figure 1. This plot shows the best response staying propen-
sities for 1 type Ci individual playing against N − 1 type Cj
individuals. Parameter set 1 is used with λ = 0.2 and i, j ∈
{0.01, 0.02, . . . , 0.99}. The intersection point of the plots gives the
unique strategy which is a best response to itself, i.e. the unique
cooperator resident Nash equilibrium staying propensity γR, which
is somewhere between 0.3 and 0.4. This value is similar to the
one obtained using the iterative method (see Figure 2). The val-
ues from the current figure are approximate only because of the
jagged nature of the lines; these occur because of the very large
number of simulations that would be necessary to obtain a smooth
version (the figure uses 10000 simulations for each combination).
The figure is used to illustrate the uniqueness of the solution only.
4.1.1. The effect of the movement cost. In Figure 2 the effect of the movement530
cost is shown. In particular, it increases the time it takes to find cooperators by531
increasing the staying propensity, that is, γR, γM , δM are positively correlated with532
movement cost; the (partial) exception is resident defectors, which we know have a533
staying propensity of max(α) = 0.99 regardless of the movement cost.534
For very low movement cost, both mutant types have a significantly lower staying535
propensity than the resident population that they are invading. They can therefore536
invade the resident population because they take less time to find cooperators.537
For higher, but still low, movement costs, whilst mutant cooperators can still538
invade, mutant defectors cannot. Here the resident cooperators are better at pre-539
venting invasion even when δM < γR for some values of the movement cost. This540
is because the movement cost impacts the invading mutant defector more adversely541
than the resident cooperators, who on average leave and regroup less often than a542
defector who will be repeatedly deserted by its cooperator groupmates.543
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For intermediate movement costs, neither mutant type can invade. At this point,544
since δM > γR, a mutant defector is slower at finding cooperators than the resident545
cooperators and therefore cannot take advantage of them. For a mutant cooperator,546
γM becomes much larger thereby diminishing their advantage over the resident547
defectors, in particular, not only are they paying a higher movement cost but it548
takes longer to find the other cooperators, which in turn reduces the amount of549
time that they can spend with them.550
For high movement costs, defecting mutants can invade, but cooperator mutants551
cannot. At this point all types have a large staying propensity and therefore do552
not interact much with one another. However, a mutant defector is helped by the553
fact that the resident cooperators always pay a cooperating cost that they now find554
difficult to recoup because they are moving very little and also paying a very large555
movement cost whenever they do so.556
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Figure 2. These plots show the effect of movement cost on the
evolution of cooperation using parameter set 1. The left (centre)
plot shows the staying propensities δR = 0.99 (γR) for resident
defectors (cooperators) and γM (δM ) for a mutant cooperator (de-
fector) used to invade the resident population. In the right plot, we
have the fixation probability of a mutant cooperator CγM (defector
DδM ) against N − 1 resident defectors D0.99 (cooperators CγR).
4.1.2. The effect of the exploration time. The exploration time T plays an important557
role in the evolution of cooperation. Changing the exploration time has a minimal558
effect on the time it takes to find cooperators because it will not alter the speed of559
movement of the individuals. This is because we are using a complete graph and560
individuals can directly get from one place to any other. However, increasing the561
exploration time has a positive effect on the coalition time, that is, the amount562
of time that cooperators spend cooperating with one another. [20] showed that563
increasing the coalition time helps with the evolution of cooperation. In our model,564
one explanation for this is that the fitness of the individuals, which is the average565
reward over the exploration time, will naturally have a higher value the larger the566
coalition time.567
In Figure 3 reducing the exploration time T from 10 to 5 steps decreases the568
coalition time which adversely affects the cooperators. One of the key differences569
is that the resident cooperators now find it much more difficult to prevent invasion570
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from a mutant defector. The shape of the plot for a mutant cooperator is largely571
the same but with a consistently lower fixation probability. In Figure 4 increasing572
the exploration time T from 10 to 25 steps benefits the cooperators. Not only does573
it help the resident cooperators prevent invasion from a mutant defector but it also574
increases the success of an invading mutant cooperator. This again has to do with575
the increased coalition time that allows the cooperators to increase their fitness.576
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Figure 3. Plots created using parameter set 2. The exploration
time T has been decreased from 10 to 5.
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Figure 4. Plots created using parameter set 3. The exploration
time T has been increased from 10 to 25.
4.1.3. The effect of population size. Fixation probability is reduced in general when577
the size of the population increases, as we see when comparing Figures 2 and 5,578
with population sizes of 10 and 20 respectively. The key value to compare fixation579
probabilities against is the neutral fixation probability of 1/N , the horizontal line580
in each of these figures, however. We see that the fixation probability is slightly581
higher for cooperators when compared to this line for the larger population of Figure582
5 (although it is also more sensitive to the movement cost) than for the smaller583
population. The key difference is that a mutant defector has fixation probability584
consistently under the neutral line in Figure 5 and so cannot invade even for very585
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Figure 5. Plots created using parameter set 4. The population
size has been increased from 10 to 20.
low movement cost in the larger population. Thus larger populations help a little586
in establishing cooperation, but help a lot in making it stable against defection.587
Increasing the population size has a positive impact on the evolution of cooper-588
ation because it increases the time it takes to find cooperators. Note that we are589
assuming that there is a one-to-one correspondence between individuals and places590
and therefore increasing the number of individuals also increases the number of591
places. Even though the density remains the same, there would be more places for592
the individuals to search in order to find cooperators thereby increasing the overall593
time it takes to find cooperators. In particular, an individual that is currently not594
in a cooperating group will have to search N − 1 places to find one, therefore, the595
probability of a defector finding a cooperating group decreases as N gets larger.596
This means that cooperators would resist invasion by defectors better, as we have597
noted above.598
4.1.4. The effect of reward and cost. The reward to cost ratio v/c is important599
because, even if other external factors favour cooperation, cooperation will not600
evolve if the reward to cost ratio is too low. This is seen in Figure 6 where the601
cost is set to 0.04 with the reward written as a multiple of the cost. When v/c602
is low, a mutant cooperator cannot invade but a mutant defector can. This is603
simply because the value of v/c is too low to promote cooperation. Increasing v/c604
makes cooperation more viable and, in particular, it allows a mutant cooperator to605
reduce the time it takes to find cooperators by reducing its staying propensity. It606
becomes more difficult for a mutant defector to invade because, on average, resident607
cooperators move less than the mutant defector as they are more in number and the608
larger v/c helps them quickly recoup any movement cost they incur whilst evading609
the mutant defector. This is the case even when δ < γR, that is, a mutant defector610
takes less time to find cooperators. For comparison with a different value of v/c, in611
Figure 7 the cost is set to 0.09. However, there is no fundamental change in what612
happens and we have a very similar figure to that for c = 0.04.613
4.2. Scenario B: Interactive strategy mutation is not rare. In this scenario,614
the mutation rate of an individual’s interactive strategy is not much slower than that615
of their staying propensity. Since the staying propensity would take a number of616
mutations to reach the right level for any scenario, any successful strategy will have617
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Figure 6. Plots have been created using parameter set 5. The
plots here are against the reward to cost ratio v/c such that c =
0.04.
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Figure 7. Plots have been created using parameter set 6. The
plots here are against the reward to cost ratio v/c such that c =
0.09.
to repeatedly face individuals of both types. The (strict) Nash equilibrium staying618
propensity will then be determined in a mixed population, i.e. there are individuals619
of both types. For simplicity we choose only one mixed state to determine the Nash620
equilibrium staying propensity which is the one where there are N/2 individuals of621
each type. The Nash equilibrium staying propensity for each type is therefore the622
one in which the fixation probability from the mixed state of each type is maximised.623
Resident and mutant defectors are of the same type Dδ. Similarly, resident624
and mutant cooperators are of the same type Cγ . The Nash equilibrium staying625
propensities δ and γ are determined by the intersection of the following two sets626 {
(a, b) : ρCa,DbN/2 = max
(
ρCc,DbN/2 : c ∈ (0, 1)
)
and b ∈ (0, 1)
}
,627 {
(a, b) : ρDb,CaN/2 = max
(
ρDc,CaN/2 : c ∈ (0, 1)
)
and a ∈ (0, 1)
}
.628
629
In the first set we are finding the Nash equilibrium staying propensity a of N/2 type630
Ca playing against N/2 type Db, where b is some arbitrary staying propensity. In631
the second set we are finding the Nash equilibrium staying propensity b of N/2 type632
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Db playing against N/2 type Ca, where a is some arbitrary staying propensity. The633
point at which these two sets intersect is (γ, δ), that is, both types will be using634
their Nash equilibrium staying propensities.635
To calculate γ and δ we use a similar iterative procedure from scenario A. To636
initialise the iterative procedure we arbitrarily choose some staying propensities a0637
and b0, and the iterative step is as follows. We calculate the fixation probability638
of N/2 type Ca individuals against N/2 type Db0 for all values of a in the range639
[max(0.01, a0− 0.09),min(a0 + 0.09, 0.99)]. The staying propensity a that gives the640
maximum fixation probability is picked, which is labelled a1. We then calculate the641
fixation probability of N/2 type Db individuals against N/2 type Ca1 for all values642
of b in the range [max(0.01, b0− 0.09),min(b0 + 0.09, 0.99)]. The staying propensity643
b that gives the maximum fixation probability is picked, which is labelled b1. Note644
that using a wider ranges for a and b gives the same result so these ranges were645
used for efficiency. After around 20 repetitions of the iterative step, the staying646
propensities a and b that give the maximum fixation probability remain the same,647
which means that we are at a (strict) Nash equilibrium because any other values648
would be disadvantageous. We therefore set γ = a20 and δ = b20.649
We hypothesize that γ and δ are unique. For cooperators, their Nash equilibrium650
staying propensity is relatively stable because it is predominantly determined by the651
movement cost regardless of what the defectors are doing. As seen in Figure 8, the652
plot for this is a roughly vertical line. For defectors, their Nash equilibrium staying653
propensity is negatively correlated with the staying propensity of the cooperators654
given that the movement cost is not too large, otherwise it would be max(α). In655
Figure 8, the plot for this slopes downwards as the staying propensity of the coop-656
erators increases. There is therefore only one intersection point of the two curves657
that gives γ and δ.658
4.2.1. The effect of movement cost. As in scenario A, the movement cost increases659
the staying propensity of the individuals and, therefore, increases the time it takes660
to find cooperators. As seen in Figure 9, what happens in this case is quite different661
to the situation in scenario A. Here, the mutant cooperator does not benefit from662
the fact that the resident defectors have a very high staying propensity as in scenario663
A. In this case, δ changes with the movement cost in a similar way that γ changes.664
Therefore, the key difference here is that a mutant cooperator cannot invade for665
very low movement cost because the resident defectors have a very low staying666
propensity, which means that they take much less time to find cooperators.667
4.2.2. The effect of exploration time. As in scenario A, the cooperators do worse668
when the exploration time is lower; this is shown in Figure 10 where T is decreased669
from 10 to 5, and in Figure 11 where T is increased from 10 to 25. The explanation670
is as in scenario A where the coalition time is lower when the exploration time is671
lower and the coalition time increases, since, as we already know, increasing the672
coalition time helps the cooperators do better.673
4.2.3. The effect of population size. Similarly to scenario A, increasing the popu-674
lation size helps cooperators as shown in Figure 12, where N is increased from 10675
to 20. As before, increasing the population size increases the time it takes to find676
cooperators because there is a one-to-one correspondence between individuals and677
places. Increasing the population size therefore increases the number of places that678
need to be searched to find cooperators. Furthermore, as in scenario A, a mutant679
defector can no longer invade resident cooperators for very small movement cost.680
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Figure 8. This plot shows the best response cooperator staying
propensity (solid line, value shown on the x-axis) versus the range
of defector staying propensities on the y-axis, and the best response
defector staying propensity (dashed line, value shown on the y-axis)
versus the range of cooperator staying propensities (on the x-axis)
for N/2 cooperators and N/2 defectors. Parameter set 1 is used
with λ = 0.2 and the staying propensities are chosen from the
set {0.01, 0.02, . . . , 0.99}. The best response staying propensities
cross at one point only, which is thus the unique Nash equilibrium,
where γ ≈ 0.7 and δ ≈ 0.5. These values are similar to those
obtained using the iterative method described earlier (see Figure
9). As before, the values from the current figure are approximate
only because of the jagged nature of the lines; the figure is used to
illustrate the uniqueness of the solution only.
4.2.4. The effect of reward and cost. For a mutant defector, the effect of the reward681
to cost ratio v/c is the same as in scenario A. However, a mutant cooperator does682
not do better with increasing v/c. In this scenario, the fixation probability of a683
mutant cooperator peaks, then starts dropping, as v/c is increased. This is because684
the resident defectors have a very low staying propensity, and are therefore faster at685
finding cooperators, making it difficult for a mutant cooperator to invade because it686
cannot avoid the defectors. This is shown in Figure 13 where c = 0.04. Increasing687
the cost c though, makes it even more difficult for the cooperators regardless of v/c.688
In Figure 14, a mutant cooperator cannot invade for any v/c. This is because a689
larger c reduces the cooperators’ background fitness by a larger amount, increasing690
the handicap that the cooperators already have.691
4.3. The effect of other parameters. The effects of other parameters are not692
shown using plots but will be explained in this section.693
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Figure 9. These plots show the effect of movement cost λ on the
evolution of cooperation and are created using parameter set 1.
The plot on the left shows the Nash equilibrium staying propensity
γ for cooperators and δ for defectors in a mixed population where
there are N/2 individuals of each type. The plot in the centre
shows the fixation probability of each type from the mixed state
with N/2 individuals of each type. The plot on the right shows the
fixation probability of a mutant cooperator Cγ (defector Dδ) in a
population of N − 1 resident defectors Dδ (cooperators Cγ).
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Figure 10. Plots created using parameter set 2. Plots are as in
Figure 9 with exploration time T decreased from 10 to 5.
Making the individuals more sensitive to their group members by decreasing the694
sensitivity parameter S improves the chances of cooperation evolving. In equation695
(38), we can see that decreasing S will increase the size of the denominator if696
the group benefit is negative, thereby increasing the probability that an individual697
moves away from its current position if it is undesirable to stay. Therefore, as S → 0698
the more sensitive individuals become, which helps the evolution of cooperation699
because it reduces the exploitation of cooperators (cooperators are now more likely700
to move away if the group they are in becomes undesirable).701
Another way in which the group member sensitivity can be changed is by choosing702
βA > 0 and βB < 0 such that βB/βA → −∞. As seen in equation (38), this will703
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Figure 11. Plots created using parameter set 3. Plots are as in
Figure 9 with exploration time T increased from 10 to 25.
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Figure 12. Plots created using parameter set 4. Plots are as in
Figure 9 with population size N increased from 10 to 20.
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Figure 13. Plots created using parameter set 5. Plots are as in
Figure 9 but λ is fixed and reward to cost ratio v/c varied such
that c = 0.04.
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Figure 14. Plots created using parameter set 5. Plots are as in
Figure 9 but λ is fixed and reward to cost ratio v/c varied such
that c = 0.09.
cause the group benefit to become negative very quickly in the presence of a defector,704
even if there are significantly more cooperators present. Once again, this reduces705
the exploitation of cooperators by defectors, hence, improving the chances that706
cooperation evolves.707
In all of the plots shown, we have only used BDB dynamics because the effect of a708
change to other dynamics is quite small. The reason for this is that the evolutionary709
graph is always complete, that is, whilst the replacement weights change, all indi-710
viduals can still replace one other. For example, in the case of DBB dynamics, to711
make a significant difference a defector randomly chosen for death should be more712
likely to be replaced with the offspring of a cooperator. However, this is not the713
case here and, in particular, the only way the evolutionary graph can be changed714
is by changing the staying propensity such that increasing the staying propensity715
increases the probability that an individual replaces itself. Therefore, the dynamics716
overall have a small effect. We note that this would not be the case for some other717
underlying structure that was not complete.718
4.4. The limiting fixed fitness case. Our general framework is complex, and719
hence so far there have been few analytical results associated with it. In particular720
payoffs for the games considered, the public goods game as in the current paper and721
the multiplayer Hawk Dove game as in [9], are frequency dependent, and so general722
analytical solutions are hard to find. This is especially true for history-dependent723
models such as the Markov model that we consider in this paper.724
An alternative, simpler, case is that of fixed fitness, i,e. where payoffs depend725
only upon an individual’s type, and not its interactions. This case is considered726
in many of the classical evolutionary graph theory papers, and in particular yields727
some analytical solutions (see for example [31, 10, 53]). We note that this applies728
for the public goods game considered here in the limiting case of either very small729
v or the probability of being alone being close to 1 (i.e. |Gn(m)| = 1 almost730
always), in which case we approximately have fitnesses of 1 and 1− c for defectors731
and cooperators, respectively. Here, the interactions only affect the replacement732
probabilities as described in Section 2.3. Below we shall give some new analytical733
results for our framework for this fixed fitness case.734
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The classical fixed fitness models involve a resident population of fitness 1 and735
an invading mutant of fitness r. The Moran fixation probability is given as736
ρAS =

1− (1/r)|S|
1− (1/r)N r 6= 1,
|S|/N r = 1,
(44)
where ρAS denotes the fixation probability of a set of mutants S in a completely737
unstructured population (because the population is unstructured, only the number738
of mutants matters). A complete analysis of the conditions under which fixation on739
an evolutionary graph satisfies the Moran probability was carried out in [45] and740
was summarised as Table 2 of that paper.741
For the weights used in this paper (and commonly elsewhere) the weight matrix742
W satisfies the isothermal property, as we have noted in Section 3.2.4. The con-743
ditions for the Moran fixation probability to hold were shown in [45] to include all744
isothermal cases for each of the four dynamics BDB, DBD, LB and LD. Thus for745
the fixed fitness case and these selected weights, in our framework every popula-746
tion is equivalent to the well-mixed population for these dynamics. Substituting747
the payoffs we gave above for cooperators and defectors into equation 44, we then748
have the following respective fixation probabilities for i cooperators (defectors) in749
a population with N − i defectors (cooperators)750
ρCi =
1− (1/(1− c))i
1− (1/(1− c))N , (45)751
ρDi =
1− (1− c)i
1− (1− c)N . (46)752753
In our results we have used the BDB dynamics, so that in the limiting case of754
v → 0 we will obtain the fixation probabilities given above. It is easy to see that755
that is indeed the case by substituting i = 1 and N = 10 into equations 45 and 46756
and comparing with the fixation probabilities near the axis in the third subfigure757
of Figures 6 and 13 (c = 0.04) and Figures 7 and 14 (c = 0.09).758
This leaves the dynamics BDD and DBB. Only a very special subclass of weight759
matrices, some isothermal and some not, could yield the Moran probability for these760
two dynamics (different for each dynamics). Thus in general these dynamics will761
not yield the Moran probability in the fixed fitness case, although for the structure762
used in this paper this is actually a reasonable approximation.763
Thus it is clear that, for the weights described in Section 3.2.4, our framework764
affects evolution primarily through how it affects the fitnesses through the interac-765
tion of individuals, and when this effect is removed (as above) significant structural766
effects disappear. We note firstly that we can have different weights that do not767
satisfiy the isothermal condition, and so for which these results do not apply; for768
example if self-replacement is replaced by a resampling from the distribution of769
groups when an individual is alone.770
Secondly, we note that some of the more extreme effects that occur in the fixed fit-771
ness case from evolutionary graph theory come about precisely because the weights772
involved are very uneven, for example relating to the star graph, where there is a773
single central vertex with many neighbours but these vertices only have the central774
vertex as a neighbour. The payoffs are typically calculated using either the average775
or the total of a set of games, one played against each neighbour. Yet if we con-776
sider weights in the way that we think of in the current paper, namely time spent777
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together, there is a problem with this. The central individual can only spend a778
small amount of time with each of its many neighbours. What then do these other779
individuals do the rest of the time? In the average payoff case they are effectively780
able to acquire the same payoff as for the interaction with their single neighbour781
(irrespective of what that is), in the total payoff case they gain zero for the rest of782
the time. In our framework individuals can gain certain payoffs when alone, and783
this would perhaps be logical for classical evolutionary graph theory too.784
5. Discussion. In this paper we have developed the framework of [11], for consid-785
ering the evolution of structured populations involving multiplayer interactions, and786
in particular created a mode of a mobile population in which the movement of the787
individuals is Markov, where the place an individual moves to next depends upon788
their current position. In previous models [9], individuals moved independently of789
their current position so the model in this paper gives a different perspective on the790
movement of individuals. In particular, we looked at the movement of individuals791
in relation to the evolution of cooperation. In what follows, we discuss some of the792
results of this Markov movement model.793
In the Markov movement model we considered in detail the version where the794
movement of individuals depends upon population history. Here, individuals make a795
decision of whether they should stay or leave their current position depending upon796
the other individuals present with them in the same place. This movement strategy797
is akin to the “walk away” strategy of [1, 2]. However, we note that this is only one798
interpretation we can use for the Markov movement model. The framework provides799
the tools to construct different kinds of Markov movement behaviour. For example,800
in [21], individuals would study all surrounding areas before making a decision about801
where to move to next. In terms of the framework, individuals would consider a802
larger subset of the current population distribution rather than just the distribution803
of individuals that are currently present with each other. Both simple and complex804
Markov movement behaviour provide useful insight into the movement behaviour805
of individuals but we have opted to start with a simpler behaviour to make it easier806
to show how the framework can be applied.807
For cooperation to evolve, it was shown in [22] that there should be assortment, in808
particular there should be a mechanism that allows the cooperators to increase their809
preference for interacting with other cooperators. Here, this mechanism is provided810
by the Markov movement of the individuals. Our results are in line with [2] who also811
modelled the Markov movement of individuals where individuals would stay where812
they are if the payoff they received was above some minimum threshold. However,813
the structure we have used is substantially different. We have used a complete814
graph with one-to-one correspondence between individuals and places instead of a815
two-dimensional array. This means that there is a high potential movement speed816
as individuals can go directly from one place to another, which is mitigated in our817
model with the introduction of a movement cost. A higher staying propensity slows818
down an individual because they are more likely to stay where they are. In terms of819
choosing the staying propensity an individual should use, we calculated the staying820
propensity which maximises their fixation probability. We considered two different821
scenarios where the staying propensity of an individual mutates very quickly or822
slowly. The key difference between the two scenarios was that a mutant cooperator823
can invade a resident population of defectors for very low movement cost if their824
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staying propensity mutates very slowly. We also investigated the effect of changing825
the other model parameters.826
The BDB dynamics used here allows cooperation to evolve even though typically827
selection does not favour cooperators with these dynamics [40]. Other dynamics828
that favour cooperators showed little improvement over the results we got for BDB829
dynamics. This shows that Markov movement is quite effective in allowing coopera-830
tion to evolve. Its effectiveness is further backed up by the fact that the structure of831
the evolutionary graph is complete, which is known to be detrimental for coopera-832
tors [40]. In particular, in a complete evolutionary graph all individuals can replace833
each other and, therefore, the individuals with the highest fitness are more likely to834
be favoured by selection. This shows that conditional movement makes the choice835
of dynamics being used less important.836
We note that our work effectively involves a coevolution of population strategy837
and structure, and that there has been significant research on this over the past ten838
years or so, as in for example [42, 43]. In such models the growth and structure839
of the graph can be strongly influenced by the game played, as well as previous840
interactions of individuals. In this case connections between pairs of individuals841
change, and are formed or broken depending upon the types of the individuals,842
in a population that evolves with link dynamics happening on a faster timescale843
that the evolutionary dynamics. A similar but more general set-centred approach844
is considered in [56]. In [23] it is reputation rather than previous interactions that845
causes structural changes; in [15] the key factor is prosperity. For an excellent846
review of this type of work prior to 2010 see [47] (see also [3] for a more recent but847
more general review). As noted by [3], a common feature of a lot of this work is848
that cooperative behaviour occurs more readily when cooperators are able to both849
group themselves together and exclude defectors to a significant extent, and this is a850
feature of our work too. In our case a key difference is the presence of variable-sized851
multiplayer interactions, the distribution of which is closely linked to population852
structure.853
Furthermore through our framework, we can see a clear connection between mod-854
els with mobile individuals as in the current paper, and those on a fixed structure.855
We see an interesting alternative (but which has a similar effect) in [16] and [17],856
where individuals are on a lattice and move when their current interactions are857
unsatisfactory. In [57] mobility (also on a lattice) is linked to reputation (where858
individuals with a higher reputation level than their locality tend to move). These859
works demonstrate that an intermediate level of mobility can help cooperation to860
evolve, which we have also seen in our different type of structure.861
In this paper we have made several advances on our previous work. We have862
largely completed the development of the framework of [11] and have shown how it863
incorporates different aspects of evolutionary game theory thereby making it very864
flexible in terms of what can be modelled. We have then applied this to a Markov865
movement model, the simplest type of history-dependent model within our frame-866
work. In turn we have used this to explore the evolution of cooperative behaviour,867
making predictions upon when cooperation can occur, with high exploration time868
and low movement cost both helping cooperation; interestingly, the evolutionary869
dynamics used is not so important for our chosen model. The example model used870
in this paper made use of quite a simplistic territorial structure that allowed the871
results to be calculated semi-analytically, that is, only a part of the results were872
calculated using a simulation. In future, we would like to model a more complex873
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territorial structure to determine the effect this has on the evolution of coopera-874
tion. As we have seen, the space within which individuals move in has an effect on875
the speed of movement. Indeed, being able to directly move from one location to876
another means that individuals have a very high movement speed. However, hav-877
ing to pass through a number of places before reaching the desired location would878
reduce this movement speed. This again opens up new opportunities for study, for879
example, the effect of common hubs that all individuals regularly pass through on880
the evolution of cooperation.881
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